The Status of the Law Prior to the Tribunal's Involvement
This much is rather clear that, contrary to the parties' contention in A/18, the law on the subject prior to the Tribunal's involvement was anything but settled. Indeed, the very fact that to one party this settled law was the rule of non-responsibility, while to the other it was the rule of dominant nationality, does by itself demonstrate the controversial status of the law as it then existed. This is further supported by a number of commentators who in their exhaustive studies have consistently concluded that historically, each of the two rules of non-responsibility and dominant nationality has always had its adherents, even though as from the beginning of the twentieth century, the rule of non-responsibility became the primary rule of general international law.
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It will be recalled that the Tribunal in A/18 does not take issue with this view of the earlier law. What it does, instead, is to suggest that because of two 1955 judgments in Nottebohm and Mergé, the primacy of the rule of non-responsibility was decidedly reversed in favour of the rule of dominant nationality. As suggested earlier, such a reading of those two judgments is unsupported. First, although Nottebohm has had its supporters, 3 it has been most vigorously attacked by others. 4 Here is but one example of the latter, where the author at the end of a detailed and well-argued article concludes that Nottebohm's doctrine of genuine link separates nationality from its recognition by other states, replaces a clear and objective criterion by vague and subjective criteria, severs nationality form diplomatic protection, dilutes diplomatic protection, contains no definition, makes it possible to deprive an individual of the only legal remedy he has, threatens millions of persons with statelessness, makes the diplomatic protection of nationals domiciled abroad for business activities questionable, and … tears apart the unity of the institution of nationality and separates the different aspects of diplomatic protection. Its over-all effect would, therefore, be international uncertainty and insecurity.
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The judgment is there further characterized as 'judicial legislation stricto sensu', and one that 'has, up to now, no chance of becoming international law; the municipal legislation and practice of many states is opposed to it, writers continue 2 See, e.g., HERBERT For an exhaustive reference to the literature on the Nottebohm judgment up to 1960, much of it 'highly critical', see Josef Kunz, The Nottebohm Judgment (Second Phase), 54 Am. J. Int 'l L. (1960) , 536, at 537-9.
